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Agency Relationship-Creditors' Group Life Insurance Policy
P, bank, had a creditors' group life insurance policy with D,
insurance company, whereby D insured the lives of P's debtors who
were under 65 years of age. P collected and submitted the prem-
iums to D. P extended a loan to X, who was over 65. X died
before repayment, and as the loan proved uncollectible P sued D.
P maintained that even though X was over 65 at the time of the
loan, P acting as D's agent had bound D by collecting premiums
from X and transmitting them to D. Held, the contract of insur-
ance was between two principals, the bank being the policyholder
and the insured, and the insurance company being the insurer. No
contractual relationship existed between the debtors and the in-
surer. The bank did not become an agent of the insurance company
by merely collecting and remitting premiums to the insurance
company. This was a mere matter of bookkeeping by P's cashier
and was a service performed by the bank. Since P can in no way
be considered an agent, any attempt by P to include an ineligible
debtor for coverage under the policy with D must be chargeable
to the bank and not the insurer. South Branch Valley Nat'l. Bank
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 155 S.E.2d 845 (W. Va. 1967).
It is generally held that employees in doing the various acts
required to make effective a policy of group insurance act for
themselves and their employer, and not as agents of the insurer.
This case represents the logical extension of that principle to an
employee acting to effect a creditors' group life insurance policy
covering his employer's debtors. 29 AM. JuR. Innkeepers § 136
(1960).
Constitutional Law-Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners
Two prisoners in the custody of the State of West Virginia filed
petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia. Both petitions were denied without
a hearing by the Court and both petitioners then filed petitions in
the district court which were dismissed on the ground that state
remedies had not been exhausted. Petitioners then appealed to the
Court of Appeals. Held, reversed. A person who files habeas
corpus proceedings in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
is not required as a prerequisite to obtaining federal habeas corpus
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relief to first file a petition in a circuit court of West Virginia
seekng an evidentiary hearing. Sheftic v. Boles, 377 F.2d 423
(4th Cir. 1967).
The district court's refusal was based on an earlier case in which
it held on principles of comity and a desire to give state courts an
opportunity to redress invalid state convictions without federal
encroachment that state remedies must be exhausted. Miller v.
Boles, 248 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. W. Va. 1965).
The Court of Appeals in the principal case overrules the district
court's dismissal and clearly disapproves the Miller decision. The
Court of Appeals held that while the Supreme Court had not
ruled on this exact question it had held that where there were two
alternative methods for filing the writ in state procedures, it was
necessary to utilize only one in order to give state courts an
opportunity to pass on the matter. The Court of Appeals also
cited with approval a Third Circuit case which held it would be
unreasonable to expect the circuit court to grant a writ when the
Supreme Court of Appeals of that state had already denied the writ.
United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3rd Cir. 1952).
Criminal Law-Definition of Capital Offenses
P, fourteen years of age, was indicted for an alleged murder
committed at age thirteen. The case was set for trial in the Inter-
mediate Court of Kanawha County under W. VA. CODE ch. 49,
art. 5, § 3 (Michie 1966) which provides that a juvenile court
shall have jurisdiction over persons under eighteen years of age
except for capital offenses. P contended that since capital punish-
ment has been abolished in West Virginia, the juvenile court should
properly have jurisdiction. Held, writ of prohibition denied. Capi-
tal offenses include those punishable by life imprisonment. Since
murder in West Virginia is punishable by life imprisonment, P
could be tried by the intermediate court. State v. Wood, 155
S.E.2d 893 (W. Va. 1967).
This decision rested on the court's interpretation of the term
"capital offenses." W. VA. CoDE ch. 49, art. 1, § 4 (Michie 1966)
defines delinquency as a crime not punishable by death or life
imprisonment, while W. VA. CODE ch. 49, art. 5, § 3 (Michie 1966)
just speaks of capital offenses without further definition. In order
to resolve the disparity in terminology, the court reasoned that
capital offenses, as used in W. VA. CODE cl. 49, art. 5, § 3 (Michie
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